Towards ensuring scalability, interoperability and efficient access control in a multi-domain grid-based environment by Azeez, Nureni A. & Venter, Isabella M.
Azeez, N.A. & Venter, I.M. (2013). Towards ensuring scalability, interoperability and efficient 
access control in a multi-domain grid-based environment. SAIEE AFRICA RESEARCH 
JOURNAL, 104(2): 54-68  
 
University of the Western Cape Research Repository   iventer@uwc.ac.za  
  
 
Towards ensuring scalability, interoperability and efficient 
access control in a multi-domain grid-based environment  
 
Nureni A. Azeez and Isabella M.  
 
ABSTRACT: The application of grid computing has been hampered by three basic 
challenges: scalability, interoperability and efficient access control which need to be 
optimized before a full-scale adoption of grid computing can take place. To address 
these challenges, a novel architectural model was designed for a multi-domain grid 
based environment (built on three domains).  It was modelled using the dynamic 
role-based access control. The architecture’s framework assumes that each domain 
has an independent local security monitoring unit and a central security monitoring 
unit that monitors security for the entire grid. The architecture was evaluated using 
the Grid Security Services Simulator, a meta-query language and Java Runtime 
Environment 1.7.0.5 for implementing the workflows that define the model’s task. In 
terms of scalability, the results show that as the number of grid nodes increases, the 
average turnaround time reduces, and thereby increases the number of service 
requesters (grid users) on the grid. Grid middleware integration across various 
domains as well as the appropriate handling of authentication and authorisation 
through a local security monitoring unit and a central security monitoring unit 
proved that the architecture is interoperable. Finally, a case study scenario used for 
access control across the domains shows the efficiency of the role based access 
control approach used for achieving appropriate access to resources. Based on the 
results obtained, the proposed framework has proved to be interoperable, scalable 
and efficiently suitable for enforcing access control within the parameters evaluated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Grid computing is an environment that provides unhindered access to computational 
infrastructure across various domains in academia and industry. It allows the porting, 
running, sharing and distribution of applications [1]. Since grid computing involves 
many users from different organizations and domains, sensitive and classified 
information may be vulnerable if no control policy for regulating and securing all the 
domains on the grid, is present [2], [3].        
The concept of a grid system is analogous to a “water grid system”. The facilities of a 
water grid system make it possible for anyone in his home to open a tap to collect 
water without knowing exactly where such water is being processed [4]. Similarly grid 
computing is able to provide endless and ubiquitous access [5] to high quality 
computing resource without having to know exactly where the data is being processed 
[1]. 
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Buyya [4], defined a grid as follows: The “grid is a type of parallel and distributed 
system that enables the sharing, selection, and aggregation of resources distributed 
across multiple administrative domains based on their (resources) availability, 
capability, performance, cost, and users’ quality-of-service.”  
The South African Grid (SAGrid) is a typical example of a functional grid. It is a group 
of South African tertiary institutions (Universities, laboratories and also the Meraka 
Institute) that are collaborating in the sharing of resources [6]. 
 
1.1 Why secure a grid? 
To prevent sensitive and important information from being copied, altered, divulged 
to unauthorized users or manipulated, has brought about the need for security on a 
grid system [7]. Without security a grid cannot be considered to be dependable. 
However, security models on the grid are difficult to implement and to sustain, due to 
the complexity of the grid environment [8]. Traditional access-based control models 
are based on recognized inadequacies and there is thus a need to replace them with 
more flexible [9] models which are relevant to distributed environments [10]. 
 
1.2 Security challenges 
Scalability: Scalability caters purposely for future expansion [11]. For a grid 
environment to be scalable, a centralized administration as well as regular update of 
the security policies is necessary [12]. In other words, scalability simply means the 
capability of a grid system such that it can efficiently handle both a small or large 
number of nodes and users [13]. 
Interoperability: This can be simply defined as the ability of various systems on the 
grid to exchange, share and utilize information across platforms. It is a security 
challenge due to disparate and unequal security policies. The characteristics of an 
interoperable grid-based environment include: 
 the presence of a central authority for security and trust; 
 heterogeneous resources, service discovery and management as well as; 
 the interdependence of security infrastructures [14], [15]. 
 
Efficient Access control (EAC): is intended to enforce control over who (agent) can 
interact with resources on the grid network. The EAC can be achieved through 
different means such as authentication and authorisation with the aid of an 
appropriate access control model. EAC remains a challenge in grid computing mainly 
because a large number of users are involved. The users are often considered to be 
dynamic in their requests. This could be attributed to the fact that each domain on the 
grid has its own policies and the domains are autonomous [33].  
To secure a grid based environment without compromising accessibility, 
interoperability and scalability the following questions can be asked: 
 How should a common security policy for various domains on the grid be 
determined? and 
 How should the security of the grid be managed to ensure accessibility of resources 
in an interoperable and scalable grid based environment? 
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To achieve the aim of EAC, it was concluded that regulation is required. To regulate 
and find a solution to the factors which impact EAC within the grid platform, a role 
based access control (RBAC) model was designed, a prototype built and the prototype 
was tested with the G3S simulator. The RBAC model is based on three primary rules: 
role assignment; role authorization and transaction authorization.  It was found that 
the proposed framework is interoperable (in terms of resources; grid middleware, 
operating system and authorisation), scalable and suitable for enforcing access 
control within the parameters evaluated. 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, a summary of 
related work is presented. A brief analysis of the various security requirements on the 
grid is explained in Section III. Section IV gives a stratum of the proposed 
architecture with Subsections A and B presenting the stages of the architectural 
model. Section V provides a comprehensive overview of the components of the 
architecture. Section VI gives an operational overview of the model while Section VII 
gives an approach for evaluating security in a triple-domain grid-based environment 
(3DGBE). Section VIII deals with the implementation and evaluation. Finally, the 
paper is concluded in Section XI. 
 
2. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN A GRID ENVIRONMENT 
The security requirements defined by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are 
ITU-T Provision X.805 and X.800 [22]. 
 
2.1  Authorization 
For any organization to allow its resources to be jointly shared between all parties 
involved there is a need for authorization: who should have access to any particular 
resource and who should not [23][18]. Globus Toolkit Gridmap files [24], Community 
Authorization Service (CAS) and Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) 
are authorization measures usually adopted in grid computing [25]. 
 
2.2 Authentication and Access Control 
Impersonation has been identified as a threat [11] in grid environments. 
Authentication is thus important to prevent illegal access [26]. The main purpose of 
authentication is solely to confirm that the user is who he claims to represent and not 
any other person. In both the shared and personal computer system, authentication is 
usually carried out with the use of a password and username. It has been established 
that when a password is used to log onto the system [4], the authenticity of a user is 
usually fully guaranteed. However a password can be stolen hence the information on 
the system can be vulnerable. Digital certificates, verified by a Certificate Authority 
[26], are taken as the best way to ensure authentication on the Internet. 
 
2.3  Data Confidentiality 
The purpose of data confidentiality is to protect data from being divulged to the 
wrong or an unintended party [27]. Two processes can be used to achieve data 
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confidentiality: data encryption and data decryption. Also, two main types of 
cryptography can be used to provide data confidentiality [28], i.e. symmetric and 
asymmetric. 
 
3. RELATED RESEARCH 
Research done in terms of securing the grid can be divided into three main categories: 
security-policy aggregation, access control and reliability in grid security. 
 
3.1  Security-policy aggregation 
In a bid to ensure aggregated security policies across different domains Tari and Fry 
proposed Global Access Control. A distributed object kernel security service was 
provided for enforcing and aggregating local and general security policies on the grid. 
In order to allow control of data aggregation, they provided a security framework 
Federated Logic Language (FELL) and a logic-based language [16]. The security 
constraint was enforced by mapping state-transition graphs which model different 
nodes on the grid. This approach is good and enforces various security measures but 
it is not scalable since it does not allow more nodes to be added to the grid [6]. 
Security-policy aggregation in terms of scalability and interoperability still needs to be 
addressed. 
 
3.2  Access control 
In the work of Yanxiang et al. a model was developed based on a public key and 
double-identity authentication on a grid. The model was developed to ensure both 
authenticity and confidentiality. For the implementation of this model, they applied 
an RSA (Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman) cryptosystem. 
Furthermore, a double identity authentication approach was employed, to include a 
time parameter on the server side. Finally, both the server and client produce 
passwords which change over time. However, this model is not scalable and dynamic 
as provision was not made for adding users [17]. 
 
Some Attribute-Based Access-Control systems such as Akenti and PERMIS have been 
in use for several grid applications [18]. These authorization systems apply their own 
rules. As a result, a dynamic attribute based access control is required for the grid 
computing environment [19]. In this model, there is no room for interoperability 
across various domains on the grid. 
 
John McLean [20] came up with a framework in which Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) models, allow for changes in security to be formalized. He employed algebra to 
construct his model that paves the way for the discretionary access control for n 
persons. This model is good but does not handle the problem that emanates from the 
separation of duties and cyclic redundancy as a result of roles and hierarchy among 
participants on the grid. 
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3.3 Reliability in grid security 
Laccetti and Schmid [21] came up with a framework for reliable grid security 
infrastructures using Grid Security Infrastructures (GSI) and Community Security 
Policy (CSP). Their analysis captured the policies and rules upon which GSI and CSP 
were based. Trust relationship based on a cryptographic key was used as a guiding 
principle. It was finally revealed that authentication implemented at grid levels 
develop a trust relationship that is transitive which is not the case when 
authentication is used at operating system tier. A formal model algebra was adopted 
in developing the security of the grid [21]. This model is not flexible as it has limited 
application. 
 
4. STRATUM OF THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
The proposed architecture constitutes two stages, each of which involves two phases 
(see Figure 1). 
 
1. The first phase involves various domains. Each of the domains is characterised by 
a user and a local security-monitoring unit (LSMU). 
2. In the second phase, the central security-monitoring unit (CSMU) interacts 
directly with all the domains of phase 1. 
3. The third phase is a processing phase. All activities that result in the granting of 
resources are carried out in this phase. 
4. The fourth phase is a grid environment phase where many resources are 
available. A user is allowed to access this phase based on a decision made in the 
third phase. 
 
4.1  Stage 1 of the architecture 
This stage involves the interaction between various users and the domains’ LSMU 
with the CSMU. The architecture in Figure 2 and Algorithm 1 give comprehensive 
information with respect to this interaction and message passing between grid 
entities. In Figure 2, a theoretical framework of the interaction between the user and 
the LSMUs of three domains, as well as its interaction of the three domains and the 
CSMU is depicted.  
To explain the process of the architecture presented in Figure 2, let us assume the 
following scenarios:  
 
i. Adam, a grid user (GU) in Domain A, forwards his request to his domain’s LSMU, 
where his authorisation is verified and confirmed. Adam’s status (eligibility as a 
user) is thus determined. This phase makes Adam’s access right to the intended 
domain known. 
ii. The LSMU then sends Adam’s request to access a resource in any intended domain 
to the CSMU to reconfirm his authorisation right in his own domain and his rights 
to access resources of any other domain. The CSMU verifies whether Adam 
qualifies to access the required resource. There are two outcomes: YES (acceptable) 
or NO (not acceptable).  
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iii. If NO, the process (request) terminates and the feedback message is communicated 
to the user. 
iv. If YES, a “clearance” certificate will be given to the user (Adam) by the LSMU of the 
intended domain and the user can proceed to stage 2. 
v.       If there is a successful processing in stage 2, the user will proceed to access 
resources in the grid environment. 
 
4.2  Stage 2 of the architecture 
This stage deals with the interaction between the processing phase and grid 
environment. This stage comes into play if and only if there is a positive feedback 
during Stage 1 (See Figure 3 and Algorithm 2). 
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The operation of the architecture is presented in Figure 3: 
i. Through the grid entry link, the GU requests access (with the role authorisation-
certificate) from the grid user authentication service (GUAS). The request is either 
granted or not. 
ii. If the feedback is negative, the entire process will be terminated immediately and 
the request will cease to continue.  
iii. However, if the feedback is positive (YES), then the request will be forwarded to the 
policy information point (PIP) (a protocol of XACML (eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language) for access control). This is to source detailed information about 
the user. 
iv. The request will further be directed to the policy decision point (PDP), which is 
another XACML protocol for access control. The PDP is responsible for making a 
decision on whether the user may access the requested domain. The feedback of the 
PDP will either be positive (YES) or negative (NO). If the feedback is negative, the 
entire process stops. 
v. If the feedback is YES the request is conveyed to the PEP.  
vi. The PEP will demand an updated version of the user permission certificate from the 
PDP (grid virtual organisation (VO)-PDP). 
vii. A certificate validation/update will be transferred to the centralized resource 
database server (CRDS) from the PDP (grid VO PDP). 
viii. Finally, a message will be sent to the user to proceed and access resources on the 
grid. 
The procedure is applicable from either of the domains available on the grid i.e. either 
Domain A to Domain B or from Domain A to Domain C, and vice versa. 
In order to ensure a smooth and efficient access control mechanism on the grid and 
also to improve the performance of the architecture, the LSMU works with the CSMU. 
That is, there is smooth correspondence between the local security units of all the 
domains with the central security unit for the entire grid. They both communicate and 
work hand-in-hand to achieve a flexible, interoperable and scalable grid environment. 
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ALGORITHM 2: DESCRIBING THE WORKING SCENARIO OF THE ARCHITECTURE PRESENTED IN 
FIGURE 3 
                 
5.  OVERVIEW OF THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE ARCHITECTURE 
In the proposed model, each of the domains available in the virtual organisation (VO) 
has an LSMU saddled with the responsibility of the domain’s local security access 
control and management. The CSMU is an advanced access control and management 
system that handles access control and authorisation for the various grid entities 
across the three domains of the model. For any access request by a grid user, the 
LSMU would verify the user’s access privilege. The model is based on the adoption of 
the XACML’s (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) request-response 
protocol which makes use of four basic components. The components are: PEP, PDP, 
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PIP and PAP. However, in this model, only PEP, PDP and PIP are used because of 
their relevance, usefulness and application in the proposed architecture. 
4.3 Assumptions 
1) A user from domain A (Adam) may intend to access a resource in domain B and a 
user in domain B (Ben) may also be interested in accessing resources from 
domain A; 
2) A user in domain A (Adam) may wish to access resources in domain C while a 
user that is in domain C (Charles) may equally be interested in resources of 
domain A. 
These are two possible scenarios when a three domain based architecture is being 
considered. Scenario 1 is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 and it is equally applicable to 
other scenarios. Adam, Ben and Charles are users in the domains A, B and C 
respectively. Each of them is bound with the security and access framework in their 
respective domains. There are six ways in which access could be requested: request 
can come from Domain A to Domain B, from Domain A to Domain C, from Domain B 
to Domain C, etc. 
 
6. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
The security of each individual domain is quite dependable and efficient; because 
each domain has its own access control and monitoring policy which is monitored by 
the LSMU. If a user, however, wishes to access resources in another domain, the user 
from the designated domain will first need to be verified by his domain. 
This is achieved by translating the certificate of his domain to the domain in which he 
wishes to access resources. The translation (or conversion) targets the access 
privileges and the identities in other domains on the grid. CSMU is mainly in charge 
of monitoring and overseeing access and security relationship from one domain to 
another domain depending on where an entity requires access. Also, CSMU is equally 
responsible for maintaining the information for mapping interactions between 
domains (see Figure  2 as well as 3). 
 
7. DETERMINATION OF SECURITY IN A 3-DOMAIN GRID VIRTUAL 
ORGANISATION 
 
7.1 Definition of simulation parameters 
In order evaluate the effectivity of the security of the domains; the following 
parameters defined below were taken into consideration.  
 
Definition 1: Let DSR(A,B) and DSR(A,a), denote the direct security rate which is 
determined and evaluated when the CSMU finds and grants permission and access 
privilege to a user from domain B to domain A or from an entity a ∈ domain A to 
domain A depending on from where the access is requested. DSR(A,B,C) denotes the 
DSR between the three designated domains. 
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Definition 2: Similarly let SR(A,B) or SR(A,a) denote the security rate for accesses 
from domain B to domain A or for an access from entity a ∈ Domain A to domain A. 
SR(A,B,C) denotes the security rate between the three designated domains. 
Definition 3: Let Assess(ai…aj)m denote assessment for entities ai...aj when ai...aj 
terminate at time step m, and 
 -1 ≤ Assess(ai…aj)m ≤ 1 shows either rejection or satisfaction during the assessment of 
the entities involved. While ‘-1’ indicates the rejection, which will reduce the value of 
SR, ‘+1’, however, indicates satisfaction, which will increase the value of SR. 
 
Definition 4: Let DSR(ai...aj) stands for “Direct Security Rate” in a grid for entities 
ai...aj. 
 
Definition 5: Let Rep(A, a) denote reputation and status of entity a in Domain A on a 
grid. 
 
Definition 6: Let Approv(ai…aj)m stand for the approval in the service request for 
ai…aj after m time steps. 
 
8. SECURITY EVALUATION IN A 3DGBE 
Determining or evaluating the security rate in a multi-domain grid-based 
environment is completely different from what is obtainable in a single-domain 
environment. The main reason for this is the interaction and relationship between the 
grid entities involved. Unlike in a single-domain environment, a multi-domain grid 
environment has more entities from one domain to another to interact with. Hence, to 
handle the complexities that arise from the user’s accessibility to different domains 
resources, the security rate (SRs) for the entities of each domain is useful for quick 
and accurate evaluation of the security within different domains. The approach 
adopted for determining the inter-domain security rate value is simple and provides 
the benefit of feedback that is flexible and dynamic in nature.  
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Figure 2.  A 3-domain role based access control architecture showing interaction 
between users, CSMU and LSM 
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Figure 3. A 3DGBE with RBAC architectural framework of the proposed model 
 
 
Rep(C,ai) yields status/repute of entity ai to domain C in a virtual organisation 
considered that ai is not an entity in domain C. It is worth mentioning that A, B, and C 
represent three different domains being considered while ai, bi and ci are entities in 
the three domains. 
Hence, 
         =                          …….(1) 
 
Equation 1 is used to evaluate the SR in the three domains A, B and C where the 
weight λ1 and λ2 are positive and λ1 + λ2 = 1. 
    (     )  
∑      ∈        
    
……………..…………(2) 
Where a is an entity from the domain A. Given two different domains Ai and Aj with 
i, j∈ 2 [1…n], where i≠ j, and n is the number of domains.  
Therefore,  
          
∑      ∈      
   
…..…………….…..…..….(3) 
When considering any domain, A, B or C, Equation 2 is generic and can therefore be 
used to compute direct security rate (DSR) between them. The same is applicable to 
Equation 3 where domains A and C were specifically considered. 
 
9. REPUTE AND STATUS ACROSS DOMAINS 
For domains Ai to Aj with i ≠ j, the status of entities is determined as follows: 
Rep         = ∑     ∈                           ...(4)  
Where θa > 0 is the weight given to Approv(A,a) for a ∈ A and ∑     ∈  = 1. Equation 4 
implies that the Rep can be determined from any desired domain and can be extended 
to any number of domains. 
 
10. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
Various simulation experiments were carried out using different simulators however 
in this example, Grid Security Services Simulator (G3S) was used [29]. To carry out an 
empirical evaluation of the access control architecture, the simulation was developed 
in Java making use of Jbuilder. In the three domains in this experimental grid based 
environment: domain A was made up of a cluster of seven nodes (or computers while 
the other two domains were LANs (Local Area Network) comprising of 13 computers 
each. The simulated grid environment was developed using the Globus toolkit 5.0.5. 
All the hardware of the test bed was embedded in Linux Ubuntu 12.04.  
A computer hosted a database with the information of all users and acted as the 
LSMU for each domain while a computer server with a static IP address was chosen as 
the CSMU for the experimental grid. For an efficient and reliable evaluation, the 
resources and entities considered were accessible when a grid user requested their 
services.  
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TABLE I.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS WITH THEIR CORRESPONDING VALUES  
Parameters Corresponding 
values 
   0.25 
   0.36 
DSR 
(ai…..aj) 
0.34 
 
10.1 Evaluation of 3DGBE and MAC 
In the experiment, 3DGBE access control was compared with MAC, which is a 
popular access control method. Table I provides the detail of the parameters used in 
the simulation experiment. Users were provided and assigned with both MAC-based 
and 3DGBE access control simultaneously.  
Figure 4. Number of available resources in the two access control policies 
3DGBE and MAC 
 
The number of resources varied over different time periods. It was noted that the 
number of available resources varied over time in the 3DGBE access control 
architecture whereas it remained unchanged in the MAC-based access control system 
(see Figure 4).  
Figure 5. Secure rate comparison using two approaches 
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It can thus be deduced that access to resources would be flexible when deploying a 
3DGBE architecture.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Average turnaround time versus number of grid nodes 
 
Equation 2 was used to evaluate the security rate without considering any weights. 
Entities in either of the domains A, B or C could request resources from any desired 
domain and the destination domain then evaluated such requests. The result of the 
SR was thereafter obtained (see Figure 5).  
 
Equation 1 was used for calculating the SR between the domains. The security rate 
value will vary if there are no weighted values for θj. Table II gives a summary of the 
required parameters. The simulation result revealed that the available number of grid 
nodes has a direct influence on the turnaround time as shown in Figure 6. 
 
TABLE II. SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR 1 DSR, REP DOMAINS A, B, C ALONGSIDE THE 
NUMBER OF ENTITIES  
Parameters  Correspondi
ng values 
λ1 0.6 
First (initial) value of 
DSR (A,B,C) 
0.58 
First (initial) value of 
Rep(A,B,C) 
0.44 
Entities in domain A 20 
Entities in domain B 15 
Entities in domain C 23 
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This implies that as the number of grid nodes increases the average turnaround time 
reduces and thereby increases the number of service requesters (grid users) on the 
grid. 
 
 To further prove and sustain the argument that the model developed and 
implemented is scalable, Figure 7 shows that as the number of service requesters 
increases, there is little and slight effect on the turnaround time which does not 
impact on the users’ services and request time.  
 
In order to further sustain the argument that the 3DGBE architecture is scalable 
therefore, the effect of increase in the number of nodes against the volume of data that 
is transferred within a given period of time (throughput), were observed and 
measured. 
 
The result of the comparison of 3DGBE (which uses X.509 certificates) with MAC, 
CAS, AKENTI and PERMIS (that use own their certificate formats) is presented in 
Figure 8. The result shows that 3DGBE has the highest degree of interoperability 
when compared to the others. 
 
In the initial setup indicates domains A, B and C contain 7, 13 and 13 nodes 
respectively. To ascertain the effect of an increase in nodes on the performance of the 
throughput, the number of nodes in each domain was increased as follows: domain A 
had 12 nodes; domain B had 20 nodes while domain C had 25 nodes.  
 
 
Figure 7. Average turnaround time versus number of service requesters 
 
The result obtained  (see Figure 9), shows an increase in throughput as follows: when 
the number of grid nodes in domain A comprises 12, the throughput is 100MB/s, 
when the number of grid nodes in domain B is increased to 20, the throughput is 
2200MB/s, while 3100MB/s is attained when the number of grid nodes in domain C 
is increased to 25. 
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Figure 8: Comparative evaluation of interoperability of 3DGBE with the existing 
system 
 
From Figure 9, it can be deduced that as the number of grid node increases, the 
throughput also increases thereby increasing the number of resources being accessed 
within a given time. This proves that the scalability of the 3DGBE architecture. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Throughput (MB/s) vs No of nodes 
 
The use of grid middleware has been identified as one of the ways for solving the 
challenge of interoperability among multiple administrative domains. This model 
adopted the XACML access control protocol, which showed the highest level of 
interoperability when compared to others. 
 
Appropriate handling of authentication and authourisation through LSMU and 
CSMU: The central security-monitoring unit (CSMU) maintains a high degree of 
interoperability between the users on the grid. For a resource request to be allowed, 
approval needs to have been given by the local security monitoring unit (LSMU). The 
CSMU serves as the central point which makes the final decision for grid resources to 
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be accessed. There is smooth correspondence between the LSMU of each of the three 
domains and CSMU. The purpose of this is to ensure adequate and an efficient data 
sharing mechanism among the domains with the view of achieving interoperation of 
authorisation. CSMU forwards requests and authorisation from all the domains 
across the domain to access any required resources. 
 
Operating system interoperability:  Aside from the fact that the architecture permits 
various applications to run (application interoperability), the architecture has proved 
to be interoperable in both the LINUX (Ubuntu 10.04) and Windows operating 
system with different middlewares (Globus, Glite and UNICORE). The evaluations 
that were carried out were done on both operating systems, LINUX performs better 
than Windows. The feature of operating system interoperability is noticeably weak in 
some of the existing models such as MAC, AKENTIS and PERMIS. 
 
Interoperability with Grid middleware: Middleware can be regarded as: 
 
 “A mediator layer that provides a consistent and homogeneous access to resources 
managed locally with different syntax and access methods” (Priol, 2005: 32) 
 
Aneka, Alchemi , Cosm P2P Toolkit , Globus ,Gridbus, Grid Datafarm , GridSim 
(Toolkit for Grid Resource Modeling and Scheduling Simulation), Jxta Peer to Peer 
Network, Legion, NorduGrid middleware, PUNCH, Simgrid, Storage Resource Broker 
(SRB), ProActive, Unicore and Vishwa are prominent grid middleware [4]. With some 
of the listed grid middlewares, the virtual organisation interoperability issue remains 
a problem. This is because of the absence of upper-level semantic concepts in their 
grid middleware layers [30]. 
 
To address this challenge, a tri-middleware integration approach was used. The 
3DGBE was enabled with three different middlewares across the three available 
domains on the grid, namely Globus 5.0, gLite and Alchemi for domains A, B and C 
respectively (see Figure 14). 
 
With this approach of grid interoperability that is based only on the middleware 
integration, various middlewares were deployed on different domains and allow the 
same set of users to share and access resources with well-established and defined 
virtual origination’s policies, irrespective of the grid middleware they intend to use. 
 
The problem of middleware differences was solved effectively by using common 
standards. The middlewares were implemented as a subset of specifications of the 
different grid middlewares. With this interoperation based approach to middleware 
integration, different middlewares need not necessarily communicate with each other 
to be able to merge and share resources.  
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The various computing resources (installed in the three domains) were all made 
accessible to all the grid users regardless and independent of their middlewares they 
intend to adopt. The middleware integration of three or more grid resources is easier 
and grid users across the three domains can access resources without any hindrance.  
 
Aside from Globus 5.0.2, two other middlewares were installed for the 
interoperability integration testing: gLite and Alchemi. These three middlewares were 
chosen because they were available.  
 
Local clusters and their security were considered as the basic elements of 
infrastructure that could be reused to aid interoperability across the three domains.  
Globus 5.0.2, gLite and Alchemi aid Torque/MAUI as local scheduler, which supports 
the ability to share local clusters and all available resources. These middlewares use 
X.509 certificates hence the same grid resources can be accessed, shared and 
distributed by these three different grid middlewares. Achieving interoperability with 
three different middlewares is simple with Globus 5.0.2, gLite and Alchemi 
respectively. Both gLite and Alchemi adopted the Grid System Infrastructure (GSI) 
model developed by Globus for user’s authorisation.  
 
The model (GSI) makes use of a digital certificates and proxies for the authentication 
and authorisation of hosts and users. Established on X.509 digital certificates and 
proxies, GSI was extended in both the gLite and Alchemi with the agreement of the 
Virtual Organisation Membership Service (VOMS), which released fully X.509 
compatible signed extensions to proxies. Additional information about the users, 
which is required for the mapping on various levels of authorisation, is achieved 
through these extensions. Since VOMS proxy is compatible with the X.509 proxy, 
therefore the former’s proxy can be taken as authentication and authorisation 
credential when deploying it on the three grid middlewares. 
 
The distribution of resources across a tri-middleware based architecture is the second 
focus in achieving interoperability. The cluster manager in charge of the local 
resources was configured in such a way that jobs could be submitted despite 
differences in middlewares. The local scheduler in the architecture is Torque/MAUI. 
This scheduler is supported by Globus 5.0.2, gLite and Alchemi hence it is very easy to 
express new queues new and added middlewares in order to utilise the same 
resources. 
 
Declarative language (queries) for interoperability: A big challenge for developing 
and implementing an interoperable 3DGBE lies in the ability to efficiently, sufficiently 
express “cross-queries” (inter-domain queries) that relate information from different 
domains. To overcome this challenge, a Meta-Query Language (MQL) [31], which is 
similar to the Structures Query Language (SQL) was adopted. 
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MQL was used for querying and restructuring tables containing information across 
different domains. As illustrated in the scenario presented, MQL was used to query 
and restructure information across Domains A, B and C within the federation. Hence, 
interoperability was achieved across these three domains through MQL dynamic 
query mappings. 
 
TABLE III: UNIVERSITY DATABASE FOR DOMAIN A 
Test scenario:  
 
Three different databases were created for domains A, B and C: a University, Hospital 
and Banking database respectively (see Tables III, IV and V). 
 
10.2 Inter-domain queries 
CASE 1: Databases were created for domains A and B and they were aggregate and 
joined to enhance further operations (see Figure 10). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE IV: HOSPITAL  DATABASE FOR DOMAIN B 
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Figure 10: Query for aggregating data from domains A and B 
 
CASE 2:  To combine the information of the databases of domains A and C, the query 
as depicted in Figure 11 was issued and the report generated shows a UNION of both 
databases for both domains. 
 
TABLE V: BANKING DATABASE FOR DOMAIN C 
  
Figure 11: Query for aggregating data from domains A and C  
 
Cross-domain queries were applied to each of the newly obtained tables.   For 
example to obtain ID No, Surname, and Nationality from Table III; File No, 
Patient_Condition and Age from Table IV; as well as Service_Code and Tax_ID from 
Table V, from respectively domains A, B and C, the cross-domain query depicted in 
Figure 12, was used.  
 
Figure 12: Cross-domain query for joining data from domains A, B and C 
-- FROM Domain_A 
SELECT * FROM [MyDatabaseOnDomain_A].[dbo].[MyTable] Table1 
   INNER JOIN 
Domain_C].[MyDatabaseOnDomain_C].[dbo].[MyOtherTable] Table2 
        ON Table1.ID = Table2.ID 
 
SELECT DB1.*, DB2.* 
FROM DomainA.Database1.dbo.myTable AS DB1 
INNER JOIN DomainB.Database2.dbo.myTable AS DB2 
   ON DB1.id = DB2.id 
 
 
1. SELECT a.ID_NO, 
a.Surname,a.Nationality, 
2. b.File_No,b.Patient_Condition,  
3. c.Service_Code,a.Tax_ID,b.Age   
4. FROM Table10 c,Table9 b,Table8 a   
5. ;   
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The cross-domain queries were introduced purposely to handle heterogeneity of 
information represented in different structures, to provide distinct aggregation 
capability in addition to the principal objective of multi-domain database 
interoperability.  
 
10.3 Efficient access control 
Access control remains a bottleneck when accessing resources in a multi-domain 
environment such as a grid. Each user participating in grid resource sharing tends to 
gain access to resources within its jurisdiction. Some grid users might want to access 
resources for which they are not authorized.   
 
To achieve efficient access control, hierarchical role based access control was adopted 
for specifying role, services as well as permission for each user from any domain. To 
explain this, consider a specific scenario (Health); where each of the domains has 
roles, services and permission defined among the users (see Algorithm 3). 
 
Terms and Definitions as used in this context  
 Let H1, H2 and H3 denote the hierarchies and let the role hierarchy (RH) denoted 
as H1, H2 and H3 be assigned to domains A, B and C respectively where H1 > H2 > 
H3 
 
ALGORITHM 3: ALGORITHM FOR EFFICIENT ACCESS CONTROL IN A 3DGBE 
 
Required: Domains A, B and C, LSMU, CSMU 
Grid User (GU) identification; 
Get the Domain’s hierarchy as {H1, H2, H3}; 
Assign hierarchy to the chosen domain; 
Obtain GU role; 
Retrieve GU services - permission; 
Proceed to the grid 
 
It could be recalled that a  
“… hierarchy is mathematically a partial order defining a seniority relation 
between roles, whereby the seniors’ roles acquire the permission of their juniors, 
and junior roles acquire the user membership of their seniors” [35] 
 
Thus 
     Let Role_Domain A denotes all roles defined in  
     domain A; 
     Let Role_Domain B denotes all roles defined in   
     domain B and 
     Let Role_Domain C denotes all roles defined in  
     domain C 
Role and services specification for DOMAIN A 
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a) Role_Domain A = {Physician, Cardiologist, Neurologist, Obstetrician, 
Pathologist, Pulmonologist, Surgeon, Pediatrician, Oncologist, Dermatologist} 
b) Services (permission)  
 {Physician (write patient record, read patient record, write prescription, read 
prescription, examine patient)} 
 {Cardiologist (treat heart disease, write patient record, read patient record, write 
prescription, read prescription)} 
 {Neurologist (treats brain, examine nervous system, write patient record, read 
patient record)} 
Role and services specification for DOMAIN B 
a) Role_Domain B ={patient , nurse, pharmacist, dentist, Psychiatrist , Podiatrists } 
b)  Services (permission)  
 {patient (read prescription , read patient record)} 
 {nurse (write patient record, read prescription, read patient record)} 
 {pharmacist (read prescription, read patient record, select prescription)} 
Role and services specification for DOMAIN C 
a) Role_Domain C ={ Ultrasound Technologist, X-Ray Technician, Clinical 
Technologist, Clinical Technologist, Dental Assistant, Dental Laboratory 
Technician} 
b) Services (permission)  
 {Ultrasound Technologist (read patient record, take ultrasound, analyse images)} 
 {X-Ray Technician (read patient record, perform x-ray on patient, interpret and 
analyse x-ray result) 
 {Clinical Technologist (read patient record, perform medical test, interpret result)} 
 
Whenever a grid user (GU) specifies his domain, the corresponding hierarchy of such 
a user will be instantly verified and produced.  The hierarchy is divided into three 
layers; hierarchy 1 (H1) for domain A, hierarchy 2 (H2) for domain B and hierarchy 3 
(H3) for domain C.  
 
Any GU with H1 as hierarchy is from domain A and can access resources from any 
desired domain whose services are defined.  The formulation is such that H1 > H2 
>H3 thus H1 has the highest hierarchy and can access all the resources within its 
domain and the domain under it, that is, domains B and C. 
 
Similarly, H2 permit grid users to access all available information in its domain and 
resources below it, that is, in H3. However, H3 permits grid users to access resources 
within its domain alone. This initial access control framework is efficient in a 3DGBE 
as users whose identities are not linked to a specific hierarchy will automatically be 
denied access to resources. 
 
The prototype was implemented in a Java Runtime Environment 1.7.0.5 for the 
workflows that define the model’s task. The implementation reveals that the access 
control adopted is efficient within the three domains considered. 
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Figure 13: Implementation of hierarchical RBAC and 3DGBE 
 
11. CONCLUSION 
Evidence from the literature reviewed, showed that scalability, interoperability as well 
as efficient access control are three basic security challenges that need to be addressed 
if the full scale-benefits of grid computing are to be realized.  
 
Based on the results obtained, the architectural framework has proved to be scalable 
when the average turnaround time was measured against the number of grid nodes. 
More convincing results were achieved when the throughput and number of nodes as 
well as when the average turnaround was measured against the number of grid 
requesters. 
 
The results obtained in terms of interoperability when the operating systems, grid 
middleware, LSMU and CSMU as well as database were implemented and 
experimented with, proved that the model’s framework is interoperable. Finally, the 
efficient access control was evaluated with a role based access control and 
implemented with a health scenario, and it yielded the expected result. 
 
Figure 13 is a comprehensive pictorial explanation of domain roles and their services 
as spelt out for each user. From the foregoing, it is clear that a cardiologist who has 
his roles defined in domain A of H1 has the corresponding listed services allocated to 
it. A dentist whose domain is B with domain hierarchy H1 can only access the allotted 
services. Any attempt to access other information or services, will result in a “rejection 
or denial of service” which signifies the efficiency of the access control put in place. 
Finally, the same condition is applicable to the ultrasound technologist who has 
his/her services defined in domain C.  
 
Other issues that need to be investigated in grid computing are: grid maintenance, 
grid coordination, pricing, grid auditing and scheduling.  These pose challenges that 
deserve attention for future work. The objectives set out in this research work were 
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achieved. It is therefore, believed that a full-scale implementation of this model, on a 
real grid system, will ensure a secure, scalable and interoperable grid-based 
environment. 
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Figure 14: Tri-middleware based infrastructure for 3DBGBE interoperability 
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